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THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 2036(a) TO RETAINED
VOTING RIGHTS DEVICES AFTER
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that in
certain situations the gross estate of a decedent shall include the value of
property which the decedent transferred prior to his death. Thus, if the
decedent has retained interest in the transferred property for his lifetime,
or for a period not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for a
period of time which does not in fact end before his death, the property is
included in his gross estate under section 2036. Additionally, if' the de-
cedent retains the right to possess or enjoy the property or its income, or to
designate possession or enjoyment of the property or its income, the prop-
erty will become part of the decedent's gross estate.'
One controversy surrounding section 2036 has been the question of
its "applicability to the retention of voting control of transferred stock. The
position of the Internal Revenue Service has been that the retained voting
control of stock constitutes enjoyment of the property for purposes of sec-
tion 2036 and that the value of the transferred shares therefore should be
included in the decedent's gross estate.' However, taxpayers have taken the
position that the retention of the voting rights in transferred stock is not a
situation within the purview of section 2036.
In 1972, the Supreme Court considered this issue in United States v.
Byrum." There, the grantor had transferred to trusts the shares of three
closely held corporations, but had retained the voting rights to the shares.
The Court sustained the taxpayer's position that he no longer "enjoyed"
the shares for estate tax purposes, and held that the value of the trans-
ferred shares was not includible in the taxpayer's estate under section
2036. 4 In response to this decision, Congress amended section 2036. The
amendment, part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, simply reads:
[T]he retention of voting rights in [transferred] 5 stock shall be
considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such stock.
' Section 2036(a) provides in full:
(a) GENERAL RULE—The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of' all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has al
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona lick sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his fife or for any period not ascertainable without ref-
erence to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death—
(I) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
For purposes of paragraph (1), the retention or voting rights in retained stock
shall he considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such stock.
The last sentence was added as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Rev. Kul. 67.54, 1967-1 C.B. 269.
" 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
Id. at 143.44, 150.
"The amendment actually speaks of the retention of voting rights in "retained stock."
However, "retained" is a clerical error and probably should read as "transferred." See Gauhatz,
The Non- Taxation of Nontestamentary Acts: Will Byrum Survive the Tax Reform Act of 1976?, 27
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 623, 624 n.4 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 11976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 3418.
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However, the effectiveness of the amendment as a prohibition against tax
avoidance devices similar to the one used by the senior in Byrum is unclear.
This article will begin by tracing the development of various devices
used prior to 1976 by controlling shareholders in closely held corporations
to avoid the usual negative estate tax consequences occurring after the
transfer of their corporate equity and the retention of their corporate con-
trol. The Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Byrum, which authorized the use of
one of these avoidance devices, will be analyzed, and the express congres-
sional response to the Byrum holding—the 1976 amendment to section
2036—will be examined. Several of the avoidance devices used successfully
by taxpayers before the 1976 amendment to section 2036 will then be
reexamined in light of that amendment. Finally, the article will present
some judicially untested devices which may be successful in avoiding section
2036 tax consequences, notwithstanding the 1976 addition to that section.
I. RETENTION OF VOTING RIGHTS CASES PRIOR TO THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1976
In United States v. Byrum, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
whether transferred stock, in which the grantor had retained voting rights,
was includible in his gross estate under section 2036. 8 In that case the de-
cedent, Byrum, transferred shares in three closely held corporations to an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children, or if they died before the
termination of the trust, for the benefit of their surviving children. The
trust. agreement named a bank as the sole trustee and vested it with broad
and detailed powers to control and manage.the trust property.' However,
the trustee only could exercise these powers subject to certain rights which
Byrum had reserved. Byrum reserved • the right to vote the shares of the
transferred stock; to disapprove the sale or transfer of any trust assets, in-
cluding the shares transferred to the trust; to approve investments and re-
investments; and to remove the trustee and designate another corporate
trustee to serve as successor. 8 -
At the time of his death, Byrum had the right to vote at least 71% of
the common stock of each corporation. Byrum's voting rights stemmed
from voting stock which he had not transferred to the trust and from the
voting rights which he had retained in the stock which he had transferred.
The government argued that the transferred stock should be included in
Byrurn's gross estate, basing its position on two separate subsections of sec-
tion 2036(a). The government's primary contention was that under section
2036(a)(2) Byrum had retained the right to designate enjoyment of the in-
come from the transferred stock . 8 In summarizing the government's
2036(a)(2) argument, the Court stated:
408 U.S. 125, 131 (1972).
Id. at 126
-27.
9 1d. at 127.
"Id. The Government cited United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), as authority
for including the shares in Byrum's gross estate under § 2036(a)(2). In O'Malley, the settlor of
five inter vivos trusts named himself as one of three trustees. Under the trust agreement, the
trustees were given the sole discretion either to pay income to the life beneficiary or to ac-
cumulate it as part of the principal. The trust instrument provided that undistributed net in-
come in any calendar year became part of trust principal. The Supreme Court held that
under § 811(c)(1)(13)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of t939, the predecessor of section
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The argument is a complicated one. By retaining voting control
of the corporation whose stock was transferred, Byrum was in a
position to select the corporate directors. He could retain this
position by not selling the shares owned and by vetoing any sale
by the trustee of the transferred shares. These rights, it is said
gave him control over corporate dividend policy. By increasing,
decreasing, or stopping dividends completely, it is argued that
Byrum could "regulate the flow of income to the trust" and
thereby shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment of the trust in-
come between the present beneficiaries and the remaindermen,
The sum of this retained power is said to be, tantamount to a
grantor-trustee's power to accumulate income in the trust, which
this Court has recognized constitutes the power to designate the
persons who shall enjoy the income from the transferred prop-
erty."
Alternatively, the government argued that under section 2036(a)(1) Byrum
had retained "enjoyment" of the transferred stock because his retained con-
trol resulted in his being guaranteed continued employment and re-
muneration, and in his having the right to determine when, if at all, the
corporation would be liquidated or merged."
The Supreme Court rejected both of the government's contentions.
As to the section 2036(a)(2) claim, the right to designate enjoyment claim,
the Supreme Court concluded that Byrum did not retain such a right and
that, therefore, the transferred shares were not includible in his gross
estate." A significant portion of the Court's opinion discussed the dif-
ference between a "power" to designate enjoyment and the "right" to do
so. The Court defined "right" as something legally enforceable and con-
cluded that there was no such "right" to designate enjoyment retained in
the trust instrument." The Court reasoned that Byrum's power to select
corporate directors, and thus to control dividend policy did not confer any
legal right to command the directors to pay or not to pay the dividends."
Hence, the Court concluded that Byrum retained only a "power" and not a
legally enforceable "right" within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2).
The Court was influenced in its "right to designate" decision by
Byrum's fiduciary duty as the majority shareholder not to misuse his power
to promote his own interests at the expense of the corporate welfare." The
Court pointed out that the directors of the corporations also had a
fiduciary duty to all the shareholders which was unrelated to the needs of
the trust or to the desires of Byrum." The Court noted that there was a
2036(a){2), the accumulated income from the transferred property was includible in the grant-
or's gross estate. Id. at 634. The Court reached its conclusion by reasoning that because he
had retained a power, as one of 3 trustees, to accumulate or distribute income, the grantor
had retained the right to designate enjoyment of the property within the meaning of the stat-
ute. Id.
"Id. at 132.
" Id. at 145.
" Id. at 143-44.
"Id. at 136-37.
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substantial number of minority shareholders who would have a cause of ac-
tion under state law had Byrum or the directors violated their fiduciary
duty." Hence, based on the fact that Byrum had a fiduciary duty not to
put his own interest above those of the corporation, and also that the di-
rectors had a similar duty, the Supreme Court concluded that Byrum's
power to control the board of directors did not result in a legally enforce-
able right to designate enjoyment."
Based on these considerations the Court arrived at its holding: "We
conclude that. Byrum did not have an unconstrained defacto power to reg-
ulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much less the 'right' to designate
who was to enjoy the income from trust property." 9
Having concluded that Byrum had not retained a section 2036(a)(2)
right to designate enjoyment, the Court next rejected the government's
contention that Byrum had retained a section 2036(a)(I) "enjoyment" of
the property. The Court determined that "enjoyment" as a term in a tax
statute connotes "substantial present economic benefit.' Applying this
standard to Byrum, the Court found that the taxpayer had retained no
"substantial present economic benefit." The Court viewed the power to
liquidate or merge as contingent and speculative and, therefore, not a pres-
ent benefit. 2 ' The Court spoke of Byrum's continued employment and
compensation as inevitable for the controlling shareholder in a closely held
corporation22
 and hence not a result of his retention of voting rights in
transferred stock. In the Court's view, therefore, neither of these factors
constituted section 2036(a)(1) "enjoyment" of the transferred property."
As a final point on the issue of enjoyment the Court noted that
Byrum had never transferred control of the corporations since the trust to
which he had given the stock did not own 50% of the stock of any of the
corporations. 24
 The Court stated that at his death Byrum owned a majority
of the shares in one corporation, and probably could have exercised control
"Id. at 142.
" Id. at 136-37. In further support of its decision, the Court observed that practical dif-
ficulties prevented Byrum's power over dividend policy from being considered a right to des-
ignate enjoyment. The Court reasoned that the three companies Byrum controlled were sub-
ject to the usual economic and business fluctuation experienced by small businesses. The
Court enumerated the customary fluctuations as bad years, product obsolescence, new compe-
tition, damaging litigation, new inhibiting government regulations and bankruptcy. Id. at 139.
Hence, there was no certainty of a flow of earnings available for dividends. Id. Moreover, the
Court noted that even if the earnings were available for dividends and Byrum could flood the
trust with income, he had no way to force the trustees to pay it out rather than to accumulate
it. Id. at 143. In light of these practical difficulties, the Court refused to conclude that Byrum's
power constituted a section 2036(a)(2) right to designate enjoyment. Id. at 143-44.
"Id.
20 Id. at 145. The Byrum Court cited Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480
(1946), in which the Supreme Court stated that "enjoy" and "enjoyment" as used in tax stat-
utes are not terms of art but connote "substantial present economic benefit rather than techni-
cal vesting of title or estates." 408 U.S. at 486. The Byrum Court also interpreted section 2036
as contemplating a "retention of an attribute of the property transferred." Id. at 149. The
Court listed as "attributes" the right to income, the use of the property, or a power of ap-
pointment with respect to either income or principal. Id. The Court apparently did not con-
sider voting rights as an attribute of the property.






of the other two corporations because of his large stockholdings.25 Accord-
ingly, since Byrum did not transfer corporate control, the Court concluded
that his retention of voting power did not. amount to section 2036(a)(1) en-
joyment. 2 " As a result of the Byrum Court's analysis of section 2036, the re-
tention of voting rights by the grantor in his individual capacity resulted
neither in a section 2036(a)(l) retention of enjoyment nor a section
2036(a)(2) right to designate enjoyment.. 27
The Supreme Court's decision in. Byrum was important because it au-
thorized a taxpayer to retain control over a closely held corporation while
simultaneously transferring estate tax liability for the value of the con-
trolled shares. The significance of Byrum was heightened when the Tax
Court, relying heavily on that case, approved another device designed to
separate the control of a closely held corporation from the estate tax liabil-
ity usually accompanying that control.
Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner" was decided in 1975, three years
after Byrum. In Gilman the decedent transferred six of ten shares of corpo-
rate voting stock to a trust for the benefit of his sons 29 but continued to be
employed by the corporation after he transferred the stock. The trust in-
denture provided that there be three trustees, and that their acts and de-
cisions be by majority vote." The trustees were given broad managerial
and investment powers, including the right to vote the stock held in trust."
The decedent-settlor was one of the three trustees and in this position
could exercise a degree of control over the transferred stock. The Tax
Court held that the value of the stock was not includible in the decedent's
gross estate under either subsection (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2) of section
2036.' 2
The court gave two reasons for its section 2036(a)(1) "retention of en-
joyment" holding. First, the court concluded that the decedent Gilman had
not retained "enjoyment" under the transfer." The court noted that a re-
tention of enjoyment "under" the transfer is required by section
2036(a)(1). 34 Gilman's continued employment as chief executive, the court
25 Id, at 149.
a" Id at 150.
27 Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in Byrum, in which Justices Brennan and
Blackmun joined. Id. at 151. The dissent stated that Byrum did retain section 2036 enjoyment
because he had majority control of two corporations whose stock he had transferred to the
trust, and used this control to remain in salaried' positions in both corporations. Id, at 151-52.
The dissent also reasoned that section 2036 was applicable because Byrum had control over
which trust beneficiaries, life tenants or remaindermen, would receive the benefit of trust in-
come. Id, at 152.
2" 65 T.C. '296 (1975), affd per curiam, 547 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1976).
1" The remaining four shares of corporate voting stock were owned by the decedent's
sisters.
1" 65 T.C. at 300. The decedent retained the right during his lifetime to appoint succes-
sor trustees, but he never exercised this power. Id.
31 Id. "The trustees were given broad management and investment powers, including
lull 'power and authority to grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and convey all or any part of
the trust estate.' Included among these management powers was the right to vole the stock
held in trust." Id. quoting the trust indenture.
"Id. at 306,
33m,
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(th. "An interest or right is treated as having been retained
or reserved if at the time of the transfer there was an understanding, express or implied, that
the interest or right would later be conferred."
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reasoned, was not a right retained "under" the transfer since he did not re-
serve a right in the trust instrument to continue to serve; there was just a
mere probability of his doing so. This "mere probability," in the court's
view, did not constitute substantial enjoyment within the meaning of section
2036(a)( 1 ). 39
As a second ground for its section 2036(a)(1) holding, the court relied
on Byrum in concluding that Gilman's retention of voting rights as one of
three trustees did not constitute section 2036 enjoyment of the trans-
fered property. The court reasoned that Byrum's retention of voting rights
in his individual capacity certainly gave him more control over the trans-
ferred shares than did Gilman's retention of voting rights as only one of
three trustees. Since the Supreme Court had held that Byrum's retained
powers did not constitute section 2036 enjoyment, the court reasoned that
neither was Gilman's retention of a lesser power such an enjoyment."
The Gilman court also relied on Byrum in concluding that Gilman had
not retained a section 2036(a)(2) right to designate enjoyment. The court
noted that the Byrum Court had viewed the ability to control corporate div-
idend policy as a "power" and not as a section 2036(a)(2) "right." 37 On that
basis the Gilman court held that the decedent's power to control corporate
dividend policy did not constitute a section 2036(a)(2) right to designate en-
joyment."
Gilman was a significant case in that the Tax Court rejected the gov-
ernment's position that a retention as minority trustee of voting rights in
transferred stock constituted section 2036 enjoyment. In so doing, the Tax
Court demonstrated that it intended to follow strictly the Supreme Court's
decision in Byrum. 39
McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 361 U.S. 829
(1959), states that for section 2036(a)(1) to apply the enjoyment of the transferred property
must be reserved "in connection with or as an incident to the transfer." 265 F.2d at 670.
35 65 T.C. at 312. The court also rejected the government's contention that Gilman re-
tained enjoyment because the Tax Court had determined that his salary was excessive in one
year. The amount of the salary that was later determined to be excessive approximated a div-
idend that Gilman had waived that year. The court noted that this would have been advan-
tageous to the corporation since salary payments are deductible and dividends are not. There-
fore, the payment of this excess salary did not show that Gilman could exploit the company at
will. Id. at 314. The court said this was so even though the attempt to benefit the corporation
was unsuccessful. Id. This appears to he dubious reasoning since the corporation was not, in
fact, benefitted. Significantly, the corporation did not recover the excess salary from Gilman.
The court also pointed out that the excessive salary in only one year was aberrational, and did
not support the government's argument. Id. at 313-14.
In one year the IRS assessed the corporation an accumulated earnings tax, that is, a tax
on retained earnings considered excessive for corporate purposes. The court also held that the
failure of the corporation to recoup this accumulated earnings tax liability from the decedent's
estate did not show that Gilman retained enjoyment of the transferred stock since such a re-
coupment daim is highly unusual. Id. at 315.
35 Id. at 310.
" See text at note 1 l supra.
"Id. at 316-17. Following the rationale in Byrum. the Gilman court also mentioned Gil-
man's fiduciary duty to the other shareholders as a furthdr reason for holding that Gilman did
not retain a section 2036 "right." Id. at 317. Similarly, the court was influenced by the fact that
Gilman was outvoted on dividend policy in three years. Id.
39 See generally Pressment, Effect of Tax Court's Gilman Decision on Estate Planning for the
Close Corporation, 44 J. TAX 160 (1976).
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Although Byrum and Gilman dealt with the formal retention of voting
rights, taxpayers also used the device of informal retention of voting rights
to avoid the application of section 2036. The Tax Court treated this issue
in Estate of Beckwith v. Commissioner. 4 "
In Beckwith, the decedent owned no stock at his death, but proxies re-
ceived from a trust he settled allowed him to control a corporation." The
government argued that the decedent had informally retained enjoyment
under section 2036 since he annually received proxies from the transferred
stock. The Tax Court held that the value of the trust was not includible in
Beckwith's gross estate because he did not retain a right to designate en-
joyment within the meaning of section 2036(0(2)." The court noted that in
order for section 2036 to apply, the grantor must retain a right "under the
transfer."'a While the court determined that the grantor need not expressly
retain a legally enforceable right at the time of the transfer, it concluded
that the statute suggests the need f'or a pre-arrangement., or at least an in-
formal understanding at the time of the transfer under which the right is
retained.44
 The court did not find such an agreement in Beckwith, but
rather found that the proxies were given voluntarily to Beckwith each year
by the trustees. 45
 Therefore, since there was no retention of a right at the
time of the transfer, the court held that section 2036 did not operate to in-
clude the stock in Beckwith's estate.
The Byrum, Gilman and Beckwith decisions all allowed controlling
shareholders in closely held corporations to enjoy corporate control and
estate tax advantages. Retention of voting rights in the transferred stock re-
sulted in both the grantor's continued control of the corporation and the
removal of the transferred stock from his gross estate. The Byrum decision
was especially controversial and promptec. a number of criticisms of the
Court's rationale and holding." The decision in Byrum allowed controlling
stockholders in closely held corporations to continue to vote shares that
were transferred to a trust, and to avoid. federal estate taxes on these
shares. This result prompted the 1976 Amendment to section 2036."
• " 55 T.C. 242 (1970).
"Id. at 245. Beckwith had the legal right to vote 15% of the stock under a trust created
by his wife, and 22% of the stock under a revocable trust which he created. He was able to
vote another 39% of the stock, the stock in controversy here, by proxies received annually
from the trustees of a trust Beckwith had settled.
"Id. at 248.
' 3 See note 32 supra.




 The Court was criticized for its reliance on the fact that Byrum was restrained by a
fiduciary duty. This restraint was said to be not as limiting as the Court had suggested because
derivative suits by minority shareholders to compel dividend distribution have little chance of
success and are not a realistic threat. Note, 11 B.C. 1Nr). &Com. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (1973). The
Bytom Court was also criticized for not finding that the retention of voting rights was a reten-
tion of enjoyment. It was asserted that this retention allowed Byrum to retain economic ben-
efits and enjoyment of the trust assets. Note, 46 Tut„ L. Rev. 1038, 1040 (1971). One com-
mentator noted that closely held corporations do not ordinarily pay significant dividends, but
that voting rights are• very important because they allow corporate control. Therefore, the re-
tention of voting rights by Byrum permitted him to maintain the most significant asset of such
stock ownership—corporate control. Comment, Judicial Limitation of Section 2036: The Byrum
Doctrine, 61 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1096-97 (1973).
See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [ 19761 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. N Ews 3418.
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11. THE 1976 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2036 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
RETAINED VOTING DEVICES
A. The 1976 Amendment
Fearing estate tax avoidance, Congress responded to the Byrum deci-
sion in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 with an amendment to section
2036(a)(1). The amendment states:
[T]he retention of voting rights in [transferred] 4A stock shall be
considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such stock.
The purpose behind the passage of this amendment may he discerned
from the House Ways and Means Committee Report:
Your committee believes that the voting rights are so significant
with respect to corporate stock that the retention of voting rights
by a donor should be treated as the retention of the enjoyment
of the stock for estate tax purposes. Your committee believes that
this treatment is necessary to prevent the avoidance of the estate
and gift taxes. 49
The most obvious result of this amendment is that a grantor who retains
voting rights in transferred stock will have this stock included in his gross
estate at its fair market value on the date of his death. Retention of voting
rights as an individual is thus no longer an advantageous estate planning
device.
Yet, there are unresolved questions concerning the application of
amended section 2036 to the various retained voting rights situations pre-
viously described. The situation is also unclear in regard to additional
estate planning devices which may be used in attempts to circumvent the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. The probable impact of the 1976 amendment to
section 2036 on the retained voting rights devices will now be discussed.
B. The Effect Of The Amended Section 2036
On Retained Voting Rights Devices
1. Tax Advantages of Lifetime Transfers of Property After the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976
An analysis of retained voting rights situations in light of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976 first requires an understanding of the advantages of inter
vivos transfers after 1976. Only by such an understanding of the ad-
vantages of inter vivos transfers can one grasp the significant effect that
section 2036 may have on a grantor's estate tax liability.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, property subject to a completed
lifetime gift was not includible in the grantor's gross estate. Gift tax rates
were approximately 75% of estate tax rates. Thus, property transferred
during the grantor's lifetime, and subject to gift taxes, was usually taxed at
48 See note 3 supra.




a lower rate than property includible in the grantor's gross estate, and sub-
ject to estate taxes. 5 ° Lifetime gifts of property therefore were made to
avoid the higher estate tax liability.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 imposed a unified structure of gift and
estate tax rates." With this unified gift and estate tax structure it now ap-
pears to be less important whether property is transferred during the
lifetime of the grantor or at his death. However, there are still significant
tax incentives present., making lifetime transfers of property advantageous.
One such incentive relates to post gilt appreciation. Such appreciation
may escape inclusion in the grantor's gross estate because only the value of
the property at the time of the gift giving is included in the computation of
the grantor's tentative estate tax." Moreover, there is a credit allowed for
the amount of tax paid on gifts made after December 31, 1976. 53 In this
manner the grantor generally avoids gift and estate tax liability on the ap-
preciation in value of the property from the date of the gifts until his
death.' This appreciation does not escape taxation entirely since the
donees pay an estate tax on the property when it is included in their estate,
or pay a gift or income tax when they transfer the property. Therefore, the
advantage of removing the appreciation from the grantor's estate is the tax
deferral gained." This may be of particular significance if the estate tax is
deferred for an entire generation."
5° There is also an annual exclusion from tax of $3,000 of gifts per donee. I.R.C. §
2503(h). There is no comparable estate tax exclusion.
5 ' I.R.C. § 2001.
" Id.
53 I.R.C.	 2001(h)(2).
54 "The importance of this appreciation element cannot be easily exaggerated in an in-
flationary economy such as America has experienced in the past and can reasonably be ex-
pected to experience in the future." Johnson, Lifetime Giving under the Tux Reform Act of 1976,
WILLS, EST,, TR, 4 3546 (r-H). The manner in which one avoids estate and gift taxes (x:curring
after the date of the gift can be illustrated as follows: Grantor makes a taxable gift of property
valued at $250,000 on January 1, 1977, and pays a gift tax on that amount. If the grantor dies
more than three years later, thus avoiding section 2035 problems, only the $250,000 will be
included in the grantor's estate even if the property subject to the gift has increased in value.
The grantor's estate will also be allowed a credit for gift tax previously paid on the gift.
Therefore,assunting that the property has a fair market value of $300,000 on the date of the
grantor's death, only $250,000 will be includible in his gross estate. Hence. $50,000
($300,000-250,000) will avoid inclusion in the grantor's gross estate. The tax on that amount
will be effectively deferred.
55 An exception to the general rule that post gift appreciation avoids inclusion in the
grantor's gross estate may be found in I.R.C. § 2035(a). Under that section, property which the
grantor transferred within three years of his death will be includible in his gross estate. This
property must be included in the grantor's gross estate at its fair market value on the date of
his death. Hence, appreciation in the property after the date of the gift will be included in the
grantor's gross estate. In effect, section 2035(a) prevents a grantor from utilizing the advan-
tages of deferral for gifts made within three years of his death. Additionally, section 2035(c)
requires that the grantor's gross estate he increased by the amount of gift taxes paid on a
transfer within three years of' his death. Therefore, the advantages of lifetime giving are di-
minished when the transfer is made within three years of the grantor's death. For further
discussion of section 2035, see in this issue Note, Section 2035: Taxing of Gifts Made Within
Three Years of Death, supra at p. 577.
56 The deferral of tax can be very significant, particularly if it is for a number of years.
Thus, if the lax may be deferred for 20 years, the effect is that of an interest free loan from
the government to the dunces for that period of time. The dunces may use the money for in-
vestment, deriving interest, dividends, and profits from it. It is possible, of course, that the de-
ferral will be of little or no value. For example, if' the donee dies before the grantor, or if the
donee transfers the property before the death of the grantor, there will be no deferral. In
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In addition to favorable estate tax consequences, there are also in-
come tax advantages which may result from inter vivos transfers of prop-
erty. When a donor in a high income bracket transfers income producing
property, he also transfers the income tax burden to the donee. Therefore,
when a parent in a high income tax bracket makes a gift of income produc-
ing property to a child in a lower income tax bracket, the overall tax bur-
den on the family may be substantially reduced.'' The value of this income,
tax advantage will, of course, depend on the tax bracket differential be-
tween the parent and the child. However, in many cases, the tax saving will
be sufficient incentive for a lifetime gift.
Therefore, estate tax deferral and lower income tax rates can make
lifetime giving advantageous even after the imposition of uniform gift and
estate tax rates in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Taxpayers might wish to
use these income and estate tax advantages by transferring stock in closely
held corporations during their lifetimes. However, taxpayers who wish also
to retain voting control of the corporation are faced with a problem.
Amended section 2036 seems to deny to controlling shareholders the ability
both to minimize estate and income taxes and to maintain corporate con-
trol. Yet the effect of this one sentence amendment is far from clear since
it does not explicitly deal with some of the variations of retained voting
control which taxpayers had attempted before the 1976 amendment. Pre-
dicting the future viability58 of these retained voting control devices re-
quires that they be analyzed in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
2. Status of Retained Voting Rights Devices After 1976
(i) Retention of voting rights in grantor's individual capacity—the Byrum
case
As previously discussed, Byrum was a significant decision for control-
ling shareholders of closely held corporations, authorizing what one com-
mentator called "the ultimate in estate planning." 59 After the Tax Reform
fact, a tax will be paid on the post gift appreciation before the grantor would have paid the
tax if he had not made the gift. Also, if the donee dies soon after the grantor, there will be a
deferral, but probably of little value. For a discussion of deferral, see 1 S. SURREY. W. WARREN.
P. Mc:DANIEL H. Aut.T. FEDERAL INCONIE TANATIoN 413-19 (1972).
" Johnson, supra note 54, at 1 3546. An illustration of income tax advantages is as fol-
lows: A person who has a very high income may be liable for federal income taxes as high as
50% for earned income and 70% for unearned income. A parent in the 70% bracket for un-
earned income receiving dividends of $100,000 would be liable for income taxes of $70,000 on
these dividends. if the parent gives 20% of this stock to each of his five children and assuming
his children have no other income, the effective income tax rates on these dividends for each
child would be computed at the children's lower tax bracket, Each child would probably be in
approximately the 34% tax bracket and the dividends would be taxed at an effective rate of
approximately 20%. Therefore, the dividends would result in a tax liability of only $20,000.
This represents an income tax savings of $50,000.
5 " "Viability" used in this context refers to the ability of the device to achieve retention
of corporate control while minimizing estate and income taxes.
" "The ultimate in estate planning for most controlling stockholders of closely held
corporations is the avoidance of a federal estate tax on corporate voting shares that they have
transferred to a trust in which they have reserved the uninterrupted right to continue voting
the shares." Pressment, supra note 39, at 160. The author also notes that prior to Byrum, most
estate planners warned their clients against structuring an estate plan on the basis of such an
arrangement because of the IRS position concerning section 2036(a). Id.
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Act of 1976, it is almost certain that when a controlling shareholder in his
individual capacity retains voting rights in transferred stock, the value of
the stock on the date of his death will be includible in his gross estate. This
Byrum-type situation is clearly prohibited by the amendment. Therefore,
the grantor's gross estate will not avoid estate tax liability on the apprecia-
tion of the transferred property after the date of the gift. There is thus no
deferral of estate taxes. Retention of voting rights as an individual would
no longer seem to be an advantageous estate planning device.
(ii) Retention of voting rights by grantor as a minority trustee—the Gilman
case
Another estate planning device used prior to the 1976 Act was illus-
trated in the Gilman case where the grantor retained voting rights as one of
three trustees of a trust to which the stock was transferred. The Gilman
court held that the transferred stock was not includible in the grantor's
gross estate." However, in light of the 1976 amendment to section 2036,
the viability of this device is in doubt. A reading of the House Ways and
Means Committee Report, explaining the 1976 Amendment to section
2036, supports this conclusion. The report states that "[f]or purposes of the
provision, the capacity 'in which the decedent exercised the voting rights is
immaterial.""' This statement would appear to indicate that a grantor's re-
tention of voting rights in a capacity as trustee, rather than in an individual
capacity, is sufficient for the application of section 2036(a).
Further support for the conclusion that retention of voting rights as a
minority trustee is now within section 2036 can be gathered from an
analysis of the factors behind the Gilman device. Applying section 2036 to
such situations would reflect corporate reality. A minority trustee may exert
great influence over corporate policy. Moreover, it is probable that a gran-
tor will appoint co-trustees who are amenable to his wishes. Therefore,
based on the legislative history and a consideration of corporate reality, re-
tention of voting rights as a minority trustee should be held a retention of
enjoyment within the meaning of section 2036(a).
(iii) Informal retention of voting rights—the Beckwith case
In Beckwith 62 the decedent did not formally retain voting rights in
transferred stock, but rather annually received proxies to vote this stock.
The court there held that since the proxies were voluntarily transferred in
a later separate transaction, the stock was not includible in the transferor's
gross estate under section 2036(a)." Thus the court refused to hold that
the grantor had retained section 2036 "enjoyment" through this informal
arrangement. This precise result probably has survived the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 since section 2036 still requires that the voting rights be re-
tained at the time of the transfer." But it is quite certain that section 2036
will apply if the court finds that a grantor is given proxies pursuant to a
a° 65 T.C. 296, 306 (1975), alp per curiam, 547 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1976).
H.R. REP. No. I'380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3418.
62 55 T.C. 242 (1970).
" Id. at 250.
a' See text and note 34 supra.
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formal or informal prearrangement, because in that instance the required
retention "under" the transfer is present." Informal retention of voting
rights thus appears to be a poor estate planning device since its success in
avoiding the effect of section 2036 will depend upon whether the court
finds that there was an arrangement at the time of the transfer. Certainty is
of great value in estate planning, and such certainty is not present in the
Beckwith situation since a court after the grantor's death could determine
that an informal retention of rights actually occurred "under" the transfer
thereby bringing the transfer within the purview of section 2036.
In any case, the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977, 66 if enacted, may
clarify the applicability of section 2036 to informal voting rights situations.
The bill makes it clear that the 1976 Amendment to section 2036 applies to
direct or indirect retention of voting rights, and applies only in the case of
controlled corporations." The Joint Committee on Taxation's explanation
to the 1977 bill states that an indirect retention is present where the gran-
tor subsequently acquires voting rights in the transferred stock." Thus, in
the Joint Committee's view, where a grantor transfers stock, and later ac-
quires proxies annually, there would be an indirect retention of voting
rights. In essence, assuming this provision of the Technical Corrections Bill
of 1977 is enacted, situations may fall within section 2036 even if the gran-
tor retains no rights under the transfer. Section 2036 may be brought into
operation when the grantor later acquires the voting rights." Therefore,
the holding of Beckwith probably would not survive if the 1977 Technical
Corrections Bill is enacted.
As has been demonstrated, it is doubtful that the devices employed in
Byrum, Gilman and Beckwith will remain viable in light of the changes in sec-
tion 2036 implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and contemplated
by the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977. However, it is probable that
" 55 T.C. at 247-48.
H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), as referred to the House Committee on Ways
and Means on April 28, 1977.
"'The relevant portion of the bill provides:
(1) IN GENERAL—SECTIoN 2036 (relating to transfers with retained life estates) is
amended by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c) and by inserting after
subsection (a) the following new subsection:
(11) Voting Rights
(1) 1N GENERAL—For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the direct or indirect
retention of voting rights with respect to a controlled corporation shall be
considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of the transferred property,
(2) CONTROLLED CORPORATION—For purposes of paragraph (1), a corpo-
ration shall be treated as a controlled corporation if at any time after the
transfer of the property and during the 3 year period ending on the date
of the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with the application of sec-
tion 318) or has the right (either alone or in conjunction with any person)
to vote, stock possessing at least 20 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock.
H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
" JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION 01, H.R. 6715; TECHNICAL, CLERICAL
AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1976, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(CCH ed. 1977).
°9 Section 2036(a) applies only where the grantor retains voting rights "for his life or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death ...." Therefore, section 2036(a) would not seem to apply
where the grantor occasionally received proxies after the transfer. The statute would apply if
he exercises the proxies for his lifetime.
608
AMENDED SECTION 2036
other devices will be utilized in attempting to make it possible for a grantor
to retain control and enjoyment of the closely held corporation, to
minimize estate taxes, and to avoid the effects of the 1976 amendment to
section 2036.
III.  PROPOSED AVOIDANCE  DEVICES
There are two new devices which possibly may be utilized to avoid the
amended section 2036. One possibility is the initial structuring or the re-
capitalization of the corporate stock so that the preferred stock is voting
stock, and all common stock is nonvoting. A second possibility is capitaliza-
tion," or recapitalization," with 2 classes of common stock, one voting and
the other nonvoting. Both of these devices will be discussed in this section.
As to the first method, utilizing voting preferred stock and nonvoting
common stock, the stockholder would retain the voting preferred and
transfer the nonvoting common. Retaining the voting stock allows the gran-
tor to continue to control the corporation." Since the retained stock is pre-
ferred, it has a stated value and dividend rights. The stock may be struc-
" In some instances the initial capitalization will be tax free. See I.R.C. § 351, However,
in order for the incorporation to be tax free under § 351, the 80% control requirement of
I.R.C. § 368(c) must be met "immediately alter the transfer." In the type of incorporation con-
templated in this article, the stockholder does meet the control requirement immediately after
the transfer. However, if it is determined that the transfer of the nonvoting common after the
recapitalization was part of a "series of steps" of a single transaction, the control requirement
would not be met, and incorporation would not be tax free under section 351. See generally 11
S. S t.R121.:1", W. WARREN. P. M cam,: t El„ H. A Fh:1)ERAI. INCOME TAXATION 181-85 (1973).
71 Although the recapitalization is tax live tinder I.R.C. § 368(01)(E), there still may be
negative income tax consequences through the operation of 1.R.C. § 3011. When the sharehold-
er retains preferred stock in a recapitalizatimi, this stock is labelled section 306 stock, and
any proceeds from its sale may be treated as ordinary income. However, ordinary income
treatment is limited to the amount that would have been a dividend at the time the 306 stock
was distributed had the corporation distributed money rather than the stock. 1.R.C. §
306(a)(1)(A). Furthermore, when one receives a carryover basis from the stockholder, as does
a donee or one who inherits the stuck of a decedent dying alter December 31, 1976, this stock
remains § 306 stock, and any proceeds from its sale, as above, will he treated as ordinary in-
come. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(C).
Section 306(b) provides exceptions to § 306(a) ordinary income treatment. However,
these exceptions are not likely to apply in the situation contemplated in this article because of
the attribution rules of § 318(a). Although it appears that § 306(a) will nut apply if the
parent-stockholder transfers all his preferred stock to one whose stock will not be attributable
to him under § 3I8(a), and his children also dispose entirely of their stock interest in the
company, this would be an unlikely occurence.
Hence, it must be concluded that the application of § 306(a) could be so severe that the
stockholder may wish to avoid a preferred-common stock recapitalization. In each situation,
the estate and income tax advantages of this type of recapitalization must be balanced against
the adverse income tax effects brought on by the operation of § 306(a).
Additionally, § 306's ordinary income tax consequences may be avoided by redemption
of the stock to pay the stockholder's death taxes. I.R.C. § 303. Moreover, the Technical Cor-
rections Bill of 1977 contains a provision which dictates capital gain treatment in cases of a §
303 redemption of § 306 stock. H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2).
72 When the grantor retains the voting stock of the corporation, he can elect the board
of directors, which controls corporate policy. H. 1-10.:NN, LAW or CORPORATIONS 410 (2d ed.
1970).
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tured so that on liquidation of the corporation the preferred stockholders
are only entitled to this stated value and dividend arrears." The nonvoting
common stock is then transferred by gift at a time when the stated value of
the retained stock can absorb the value of the corporation. This is impor-
tant because if at the time of the gift the value of the corporation is re-
flected in the retained preferred stock, there will be minimal gift tax con-
sequences when the common stock—with little or no value—is trans-
ferred."
By thus retaining voting preferred stock and making a gift of nonvot-
ing common stock, the donor is in a position to take advantage of tax de-
ferral. This results since the device permits the donor to exclude the value
of post-gift appreciation from his estate. Under the. unified gift and estate
tax provisions, only the fair market value of the stock at the date of the gift
will be includible in the grantor's gross estate. Therefore, the appreciation
in value of the transferred stock after the date of the gift will not be in-
cluded in the grantor's gross estate. Moreover, since the preferred stock-
holders are only entitled to the stated value of their stock, any appreciation
in the value of the corporation will take place in the transferred nonvoting
common stock. As noted earlier, it is the donees who will pay an estate, gift
or income taxes on the post transfer appreciation." Thus, this device pro-
vides the advantage of tax deferral."
Another device which may be used to avoid the effect of the amended
section 2036 is a variation of the just discussed scheme of retaining voting
preferred stock and making a gift of nonvoting common stock. This varia-
tion involves a corporate structure with two classes of common stock. Only
one of these classes would be voting, and this class should represent only a
small percentage of the total common stock of the corporation. In this
manner, the class of nonvoting common will represent a large percentage
of the corporation's total value. The grantor then retains the small amount
of stock representing the entire voting power of the corporation, and trans-
fers all the nonvoting common. The result is much like that achieved when
the grantor retains voting preferred and transfers nonvoting common since
post gift appreciation will be reflected in the transferred nonvoting com-
mon. However, where the grantor retains common stock, a portion of the
appreciation in value of the corporation after the gift will take place in this
retained common stock. The amount of this appreciation of course should
73
 The stock is preferred because on liquidation of the corporation the claims of the
preferred stockholders normally must be satisfied before the common stockholders receive
anything. The dividends paid on the preferred shares are usually based on a percentage of
the face value of the stock. The preferred stockholders would not share in high earnings of
the corporation, and preferred stock dividends are usually limited to this stated percentage. If
the stock is participating, however, it may share in corporate dividends in excess of the stated
percentage. See H. HENN, supra note 68, at 208-12.
" I.R.C. § 25I2(a). The transferred stock has little value at the time of the transfer be-
cause the value of the corporation is reflected in the retained voting stock.
76
 The device of retaining preferred voting stock and transferring nonvoting common
stock has the greatest utility when most of the appreciation in value of the transferred stock
occurs after the date of the gift since the post gift appreciation will not be included in the
grantor's gross estate. Conversely, when the appreciation in value of the corporation has oc-
curred prior to the gift, this device has little value because the pre-gilt appreciation will be in-
cluded in the grantor's gross estate.
76
 For an illustration of this principal, see note 54 supra.
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be slight since the retained voting common should represent only a small
percentage of the total corporate equity. Therefore, most of the apprecia-
tion in value of the corporation after the gift should be reflected in the
nonvoting common" and the donees will be liable for the taxes on this ap-
preciation. As noted, by using this device involving dual classes of common
stock, the donor's estate will be liable for some post-gift appreciation in the
value of the corporation. Consequently, the tax deferral will not be as sig-
nificant as when the grantor retains preferred stock, since in that case there
would be no post transfer appreciation includible in the grantor's gross es-
tate.
These two capitalization devices appear to avoid the effect of the 1976
amendment to section 2036 since in the use of the devices the grantor is
not retaining voting rights in transferred stock, but is retaining the voting
stock itself. Thus, the grantor can use either scheme to transfer the value
of the corporation while retaining voting control.
Nevertheless, the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977 78 may present an
obstacle regarding the use of capitalizations and recapitalizations to avoid
the effect of section 2036. That bill provides that an indirect retention of
voting rights in a controlled corporation constitutes section 2036 enjoy-
ment. Arguably, capitalizations and recapitalizations could be viewed as
transfers in which the grantor has indirectly retained voting rights since in
either situation the grantor is retaining the voting stock of the corporation
and making a transfer of nonvoting common. Hence, it appears that the
grantor has made a transfer of stock after which he has indirectly retained
the voting stock of the corporation. There are, however, several answers to
the argument that these capitalization and recapitalizations result in an "in-
direct retention" within the meaning of the 1977 Bill.
In the first place, the very words of the House Ways and Means
Committee, in its report accompanying the 1977 Technical Corrections Bill,
seem to rebut this "indirect retention" position. The text of the committee
report commenting on the proposed amendment to section 2036 states:
Where the decedent owned both voting and nonvoting stock and
transferred the nonvoting stock to another person, the rule [re-
quiring inclusion in the gross estate where a decedent indirectly
retained voting rights in stock of a controlled corporation trans-
ferred by him] does not apply to the nonvoting stock simply be-
cause of the decedent's ownership of the voting stock."
Thus, congressional intent would not call for the applicability of' section
2036 to a capitalization or recapitalization scheme.
Another counter argument to the indirect retention position is based
on the statutory language. Section 2036 requires retention of voting rights
in transferred stock. 80 In a capitalization or recapitalization the voting
" As an illustration of this, assume that the retained voting common represents 5% of
the total common stock, the other 95% representing the nonvoting common which was trans-
ferred. Of the post gift appreciation, 5% will be reflected in the retained common, but 95% of
the appreciation will be represented in the transferred stock, and hence will not he includible
in the grantor's gross estate.
" See note 66 .supra.
" H.R. REP. No. 700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in FED. TAXES EST. & GIFT 1135,
311 (P-H October 12, 1977).
" See note 3 supra.
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rights are retained in retained stock. Therefore, section 2036 should not
apply since no voting rights are retained in transferred stock. Hence, the
stockholder should succeed in maintaining corporate control and remove
post gift appreciation from his estate. Moreover, it is possible that the "in-
direct retention" provision of the 1977 bill will not be enacted. Therefore,
it is probable that these situations would succeed in avoiding the effect of
the section.
Even if the indirect retention argument cannot be used to bring sec-
tion 2036 into operation, these devices may yet be brought within section
2036 as a 2036(a)(2) "right" by the grantor to designate enjoyment. This
type of § 2036(a)(2) argument was treated by the government in Revenue
Ruling 67-54. 81
 There, upon recapitalization, the grantor retained all ten
voting shares of the corporation, and transferred 990 shares of nonvoting
stock to a trust for the benefit of his children. The trustee was required to
obtain the permission of the grantor before disposing of the stock. The
value of the transferred stock was held to be includible in the grantor's
gross estate:
Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds
for the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over
the dividend policy of the corporations, he has retained, for a
period which did not in fact end before his death, the tight to
determine the income from the nonvoting stock. If he also re-
tains control over the disposition of the nonvoting stock, either
as trustee, by restriction upon the trustee, or alone or in conjunc-
tion with another, he has in fact made a transfer whereby he has
retained for his life the right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the transferred property or the income there-
from. 82
The ruling thus treated the grantor, who had transferred nonvoting stock
in trust while retaining voting stock in the same corporation, as retaining
for his life, or for a period which did not in fact end before his death, the
right to designate who shall possess or enjoy the transferred property. Con-
sequently under section 2036(a)(2), the value of the transferred stock was
includible in the grantor's gross estate. 83
Revenue Ruling 67-54 refers to the grantor's "right" to designate pos-
session or enjoyment. It also quotes treasury regulation section 20-2036-
1(b)(3) of the Estate Tax Regulations which states in part that such a right
"includes a reserved power to designate the person or persons to receive
the income from the transferred property, or to possess or enjoy non-
income producing property, during the decedent's life or during any other
period described in paragraph (a) of this section." 84 The interpretation of a
section 2036(a) "right" in Revenue Ruling 67-54 appears to be consistent
with the regulations. Both of these interpretations equate a "power to des-
ignate" with a 2036(a)(2) "right to designate." Hence, under this analysis
recapitalization would not avoid the effect of section 2036, since the stock-
" Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 C.B. 269.
° 2 1d. at 270.
" 3 1d.
"Id. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958) (amended 1960) also states that it is immater-
ial in what capacity the grantor exercised this power.
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holder would retain the power to control corporate dividend policy which
Revenue Ruling 67-54 and regulations have determined to be within sec-
tion 2036. However, both of these interpretations appear to be at variance
with the interpretation of' section 2036(a)(2) which the Supreme Court ren-
dered in Byrum.
Under the Byrum interpretation, when a grantor retained merely a
power" he did not retain a section 2036 "right." 85 Therefore, the authority
of Byrum on this point would allow a recapitalization to avoid the effect of'
section 2036, since the grantor would be retaining only a "power" and not
a "right" within the meaning of the statute. Since the precedential value of'
Byrum is important in determining the viability of recapitalizations, the
Byrum Court's section 2036(a)(2) holding must be reconsidered in light of'
the 1976 amendment.
The 1972 Byrum decision apparently authorized what Revenue Ruling
67-54 had forbidden in 1967. Congress intended to overrule Byrum in
1976, but its success on this point is in doubt. The 1976 amendment does
not address the section 2036(a)(2) designation of enjoyment.. Even a situa-
tion such as that found in Revenue Ruling 67-54 does not clearly come
within the language of the 1976 amendment since there is no retention of
voting rights in transferred stock. Rather, in a situation such as that in Rev-
enue Ruling 67-54, the voting stock itself is retained and nonvoting stock
is transferred. Therefore, it is possible that the Byrum Court's position that
the grantor has retained a power and not a 2036(a)(2) right may still have
precedential value.
If the Byrum Court's reasoning on 2036(a)(2) is still valid, then re-
capitalization may avoid the effects of 2036. In the recapitalization the
grantor retains "powers,"—i.e. voting control of the company, power to
elect a board of directors and pov;ter to control dividend policy—similar to
those which the Byrum Court refused to view as section 2036 rights. The
grantor in a recapitalization is also restrained—as was the grantor in
Byrum—from acting against the interests of the other shareholders or the
corporation by a fiduciary duty owed to the owners of the nonvoting com-
mon. Therefore, despite Revenue Ruling 67-54 and the regulations, the re-
capitalizations may be successful in resisting a section 2036(a)(2) designation
of enjoyment attack. If this is so, recapitalization would allow a grantor to
continue corporate control and reduce his estate tax liability.
It is possible, however, that Byrum's section 2036(a)(2) position has
been undermined by the 1976 amendment to section 2036, and that Rev-
enue Ruling 67-54 is therefore controlling. By enacting the 1976 amend-
ment to section 2036 it may be that Congress was rejecting not only the
narrow holding of Byrum, but its entire section 2036 rationale as well.
Nevertheless, even if Revenue Ruling 67-54 is still effective, a re-
capitalization may be distinguishable from the situation outlined in the rul-
ing. If such were the case, the ruling would not be dispositive. In Revenue
Ruling 67-54, the nonvoting common stock was transferred to a trust with
restrictions on the disposition of the stock. In contrast, in a recapitalization
the grantor may transfer the stock to his children as individuals, or to a
trust with no restrictions as to disposition of the stock. Hence Revenue Rul-
" 408 U.S. at 136-37.
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ing 67-54 and section 2036(a)(2) may not be applicable" since the children
or trustee could sell the stock and thereafter would not be dependent on
the dividend policy of the grantor's corporation for their income. There-
fore, the grantor would not be in a position to designate who should enjoy
the income from the property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2).
Although it is unclear whether the previously discussed re-
capitalizations will succeed in withstanding section 2036 attacks, it is prob-
able that they will be attempted and will require judicial or legislative con-
sideration. However, even if these recapitalizations do withstand section
2036 challenge, it must also be noted that the taxpayer may face the
further problem of a "control premium" being assigned to his retained
stock.
The Internal Revenue Service may take the position that the retained
stock includible in the gross estate should include an additional value as-
signed as a "control premium." This "control premium" represents the ad-
ditional value of the stock due to the voting control element inherent in the
stock." Assigning a voting control element reflects the corporate reality
that a controlling shareholder's interest in the corporation is more valuable
than his actual percentage of stock ownership because he can control cor-
porate policy. For instance, in Estate of Salisbury'," the decedent. owned
51.8% of the voting power of the outstanding shares at the time of his
death. The Tax Court held that the fair market value of the stock on the
date of his death should include a "control premium" of 38.1%" of the
stated value of the shares.
The application of such a "control premium" defeats at least in part
the purpose for which any one of the aforementioned estate tax avoidance
devices are used. By valuing the voting shares at their stated value plus a
"control premium," at least a portion of the appreciation in the transferred
stock after the date of the transfer would, in effect, be included in the
grantor's gross estate. How much of the appreciation would be included in
the grantor's gross estate is unclear, since it depends on the court's de-
termination of the value of the "control premium."
In summary, the previously discussed recapitalizations may succeed in
avoiding the effect of the amended section 2036, although the government
may attempt to increase the estate tax valuation of the retained stock
through the imposition of a "control premium." However, in the event that
these recapitalizations do achieve the dual objective of allowing corporate
control and estate tax minimization, they will be a powerful estate planning
tool.
"' 1f the trustee could dispose of the stock, the trust would consist of the proceeds from
the sale, or new property purchased with the proceeds. Under these circumstances, the grant-
or would not have retained a "right to designate" within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2)
since his control of the corporate dividend policy would not necessarily control the now of in-
come to the trust. It is important to note, though, that the grantor often wants the stock to
remain in trust for the benefit of his children. The trustee's selling of the stock, which the
grantor could not prevent, would be contrary to his wishes. Therefore, ihe grantor may well
wish to put restrictions on the disposition of the stock, thus increasing the possibility of a sec-
tion 2036 attack.
87 As stated in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(1), in valuing stock for estate tax purposes "the
degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be valued" is a relevant
factor.
" 1975 T.C.M. 1 333, at 1401 (P-H).
" 38.1% was the court's somewhat arbitrary estimate of the value of the voting control
element. Id. at 1417.	 614
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CONCLUSION
The 1976 amendment to section 2036 states that the retention of vot-
ing rights in transferred stock is a retention of enjoyment of that stock.
When such enjoyment is present, section 2036 mandates that the value of
the transferred stock on the date of the grantor's death be included in his
gross estate. Taxpayers wishing to avoid this result probably will utilize sev-
eral devices to remove post gift appreciation from their gross estate. Tax-
payers today probably will use capitalization or recapitalization devices as a
means to avoid the 1976 amendment to section 2036. Although there are
variations on these devices, they basically involve the retention of corporate
control in the form of voting preferred stock or voting common stock, with
the removal of post gift corporate appreciation by the transfer of nonvot-
ing common stock in which the subsequent financial growth of the com-
pany will take place. These devices will certainly encounter section 2036
challenges by the government, and although the outcome of these clashes is
not clear it is probable that they will be upheld.
DAVID F. KANE
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